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This thesis presents an analyses of the Ship Construction and
Conversion, Navy, Appropriation cost estimates for new ship construction
during the period 1960-1992. Emphasis is placed on four specific shipbuilding
programs: Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG-51), Fleet Ballistic Submarine
(Trident), Attack Submarine (SSN-688), and Guided Missile Cruiser (CG-47).
These programs are analyzed to determine how competition /dual sourcing,
contract type and the shipbuilding marketplace have influenced the actual
costs of these ships. These programs are also compared for the period 1981-
1992 to determine if there are any trends or consistency for all of the
programs.
The research concludes that the shipbuilding marketplace has a
significant influence on actual construction costs of Navy ships. When there
is limited commercial work available the shipbuilders may underbid
contracts to remain in business. Competition in Navy shipbuilding does not
necessarily result in cost savings due to the small number of ships produced
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The declining Department of Defense budget has heightened the need for
accurate ship cost estimates to enable the Navy to make supportable resource
decisions. Ship cost estimates not only influence the current Navy budget,
but they have a significant impact on future budget decisions. The final cost
of new construction ships has a direct impact on the design of future naval
ships and the ultimate number of ships in the fleet.
This research investigates the Department of the Navy estimating and
budgeting experience for the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
appropriation (SCN). Emphasis is placed on new construction programs and
includes a comparison of original budget estimates with the actual ship end
cost. Since shipbuilding is a large capital venture requiring a lengthy
construction period it is essential that budget estimates be realistic to enable
decision makers to make informed resource allocation decisions. This study
analyzes the budget decisions of past programs in order to learn from those
decisions and thereby make more confident projections about future
shipbuilding program budgets.
B. OBJECTIVE
The focus of this thesis is on the Ship Construction and Conversion
appropriation (SCN) during the period 1960-1992. Four major new
shipbuilding programs were selected for detailed data analysis. They are: the
Fleet Ballistic Submarine (Trident), Attack Submarine (SSN-688), Guided
Missile Cruiser (CG-47), and Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG-51). These
programs were selected as the ship construction programs to examine based
on the large monetary value of each program. In addition, all four programs
currently have ships under construction and these ships will be utilized by
the Navy well into the twenty first century. All programs except the DDG-51
have current and comparable data for the last 10 years. The DDG-51 has data
for only seven years. However, the DDG-51 is the newest of the four
programs. It is projected to have new ship construction appropriations for
several years.
Program documents and budget estimates were reviewed to identify
specific program events and to compare the original estimates with the actual
cost. Each program was reviewed individually and then compared with the
other programs to determine if a consistent or predictable pattern emerged
for all of the shipbuilding programs.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary question is : why are there deviations between the estimated
end cost for new ship construction and the actual end cost? The secondary
questions include: are there patterns or trends which cause deviations in the
cost, and what can be done to modify or correct the deviations?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The predominant focus of the thesis is on new ship construction over the
past ten years. However, the total SCN account was examined from 1960 to
1991 to check for long term trends. During this period the shipbuilding
industry and the budget estimates went through multiple changes,
experiencing both cost underruns and overruns. For the period 1981 to the
present a detailed analysis is conducted on the four selected new ship
construction programs.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW
The information used in this thesis comes from a literary search and a
research trip to Washington D.C. Some of the more pertinent information
was obtained from Department of Defense instructions, and previous studies
on cost estimation, and cost growth.
Data was gathered by reviewing Naval Comptroller (NAVCOMPT)
budget documents and NAVAL SEASYSTEMS COMMAND (NAVSEA) cost
reports for both the overall SCN account and the individual programs.
Several days were also spent at both NAVCOMPT and NAVSEA offices in
Washington D.C. interviewing key personnel involved in the SCN budget
process. Other more general information was obtained from the Shipbuilders
Council of America quarterly reports and from Jane's Fighting Ships.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The thesis research will begin by describing the magnitude of the SCN
account. Various theories and reasons for cost growth will then be discussed.
The research data is organized into four periods: Period I (1960-1971), a high
demand period for Navy shipbuilding; Period II (1971-1975) a period of
industrial revolution and high rates of inflation; Period III (1976-1981) a time
of stability in cost estimates and changes in budgetary procedures; and Period
IV (1981-present) a period of fluctuating demand (force cutbacks). Following
the overall historical trend is an in-depth analysis of the four selected
programs and how the factors of cost growth have impacted these programs
over the last ten years. The conclusion section provides a projection on what
may be expected in the future regarding SCN budget estimates. This
projection is based on the data analysis from reviewing the historical trends
of the four selected ship types.
The next section provides important background information on the
uniqueness of the Navy appropriation entitled Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy or SCN.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION
The Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, Appropriation (SCN) is a
multibillion dollar fund, accounting for approximately 10 to 15 percent of the
Department of the Navy Total Obligational Authority and 35 to 45 percent of
the total annual procurement budget. The SCN budget finances the
construction of new ships and the conversion of existing ships, including
hulls, mechanical and electrical equipment, electronics, guns, torpedo and
missile launching systems, and communications systems. It also finances
procurement of long lead time items for ships for which authorization will be
requested in the following fiscal year. [REF. 1 pg. 4-79]
With the exception of FY 1983 and FY 1988 when aircraft carriers were
funded for construction, the dollar value of the SCN appropriation has been
steadily declining over the last ten years, as shown in Figure 1. This is
significant since the number of ships purchased by the Navy has remained
virtually constant over the same time period, as shown in Figure 2.
Although the SCN appropriation is only 10-15 percent of the total Navy
budget, the dollar amount is significant. The 1990 SCN appropriation was
$9.3 billion dollars. However, when a new combatant such as the DDG-51
costs an average of $819 million dollars [REF. 2 pg. 6] the quantity of ships that
can be acquired is limited and proper utilization of resources becomes crucial.
Since the Navy adheres to a "full funding" policy, as directed by the
Department of Defense, [REF. 1 pg. 6-89 ] a SCN procurement item has been
authorized by Congress must be funded in total at all times. However, since
Figure 1
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ship construction is such a long term program, funding may have to be
modified. The Ship Construction Adjustments (SCA) can be used to meet
changes in expected end costs. (Appendix A)
Shipbuilding requires a time period from five to eight years to complete
the average new construction vessel. The DOD full funding requirement
means that total end cost must be estimated for ships that are still years from
completion. Thus, many changes can occur during the construction process
that may affect the eventual ship end cost. With the decline in the defense
budget and the subsequent decline in the SCN appropriation, it is imperative
that the Navy have accurate estimates of ship end costs. Every dollar spent for
construction becomes significant. It is with this precept that the reasons for
cost growth are examined to determine if there are any consistent or
predictable factors that affect the cost estimates.
B. COST GROWTH
Many factors can impact the ship cost estimates. Some of the factors most
commonly considered as contributing to cost growth in shipbuilding
programs are investigated in this research. They are:
- competition/ dual source production
- contract type
- commercial/military market
This research will focus on these factors to see how they have affected cost
estimates over the last 30 years.
C COMPETITION/DUAL SOURCING
DOD decision makers are under a mandate to use scarce resources wisely,
due to the growing pressures from the Administration, Congress, and the
American public. It is a widely held belief that competition can produce great
savings in acquisition costs. However, savings cannot be expected from every
competitive procurement. Thus, the theory of competition in the
shipbuilding industry will be examined.
There is a deep-seated belief that the best approach for Government
procurement is solicitation of price offers from a maximum of qualified
sources. In his memorandum (1985) accompanying Recommendation 32 of
the Acquisition Improvement Program (AIP), Deputy Secretary of Defense
Frank C. Carlucci said, in part:
"The value of competition in the acquisition process is one of
our most widely accepted concepts. We believe that it reduces
the costs of needed supplies and services, improves contractor
performance, helps to combat rising costs, increases the
industrial base, and ensures fairness of opportunity for award of
government contracts. [REF. 3 pg. 10]
Thus the notion of competition has manifested itself in the procurement
of defense weapons systems. Current DOD instructions state that defense
systems, subsystems, equipment, supplies and services shall be acquired on a
competitive basis to the maximum extent practicable as a means of achieving
cost, schedule, and performance benefits. [REF. 4 pg. 1-6] This commitment to
competition stems from the widely held belief that better products are
provided at lower prices in a competitive rather than non-competitive
environment. [REF. 3 pg. 11]
D. BENEFITS OF COMPETITION
There are many perceived benefits from competition. Cost savings has
been the primary benefit of competition. However, there are additional
reasons for competition, they are: increased contractor efficiency, reduced risk,
mobilization/surge capability, and political benefits. Realization of one type
of benefit may not necessarily be consistent with realization of another. Each
of these reasons for introducing competition by using multiple sources is
discussed below.
1. Cost Savings
The classic rationale for competition is that competitive markets will
result in the lowest cost for a product. The justification for introducing
competition in procurement is the opportunity to achieve a lower unit
production cost. [REF. 5 pg. 45]
A 1965 statement by then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to
the Joint Economics Committee of Congress asserted that savings on the
order of 25% or more generally resulted from a conversion to competitive
procurement from a sole source. [REF. 6 pg. 18] While there are questions
about the generality of the savings, the fact remains that, in a competitive
market environment, the price paid by the buyer tends to move in the
direction of the minimum costs of production. [REF. 7 pg. 32]
Cost growth as it relates to Navy construction may indicate that with
competition, the contractors are submitting low bids in order to secure the
Navy contract. However, if actual costs tend to decrease with the introduction
of a second source of production, competition may actually encourage
efficiency and therefore lower costs to the Navy. Thus, competition may have
different effects on cost growth and actual costs.
2. Increased Contractor Efficiency
Use of multiple producers may arguably result in increased
contractor efficiency as reflected in such items as product quality control,
adherence to delivery schedules, and more rapid technological progress. For
the producing contractor, the motivation for increased efficiency is the
improvement in the negotiating position for later contract awards. A fresh
look at the hardware by competent engineers of the competing firms often
results in technical improvements and better problem solving. [REF. 3 pg. 14]
3. Reduced Risk
The use of multiple producers may reduce several types of risk.
Technical risk may be reduced during both design and production phases.
Employing more than one contractor increases the likelihood that stumbling
blocks will be overcome or alternative options created by using differing
approaches or techniques. Using second source production facilities decreases
the likelihood that physical destruction of a shipyard or strikes will slow or
stop production of vital items. Use of more than one producer also reduces
the risks to the government associated with contractor labor difficulties and
financial instability. [REF. 3 pg 15]
4. Mobilization/Surge Capability
Another claimed benefit of competition, particularly dual sourcing,
is that the U.S. industrial base will have a greater capacity to "surge"
production in the event of a war or national emergency. Traditionally the
objective of maintaining a strong industrial base is to be able to provide an
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increased quantity of virtually all systems in the current force structure.
Proponents of the mobilization base point to the classic "gearing up" of the
industrial base prior to the American entry into World War Two. Successful
mobilization made a vital contribution to victory in that war. For this reason,
maintenance of the mobilization base is considered essential and is a factor in
the awarding of weapon system contracts. [REF. 8 pg. 21] However, in the
current environment the need for mobilization may not be a realistic
justification for dual source production, since the threat of an extended
conventional war has diminished. [REF. 8 pg. 33]
5. Political Benefits
Awarding contracts to more than one source often contributes
heavily to successful funding for weapon programs in the annual budget
battle. Major contract awards generally create significant numbers of new
jobs in the congressional districts where the winning contractors are located.
[REF.7pg.3]
E. CONTRACTS
The nature of the contract that is written with the shipbuilder also has an
impact on the end cost of the ship compared to the estimate. The
distinguishing feature among the various kinds of contacts used for Naval
shipbuilding is the way risk is shared between the Navy and the contractor.
The risk sharing arrangement is reflected in the contractor's escalation clause
and incentive features. [REF. 9 pg. 4]
The risks of price changes due to inflation are partly borne by the Navy
through escalation clauses. These clauses increase the allowable labor rates
and material fees to keep pace with Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) indices of
11
labor and material prices over the life of the program. The SCN appropriation
has been allowed to budget for escalation due to the extensive period of time
to construct new ships.
1. Incentive Provisions
Incentive provisions of the contract determine how the cost variance
risk of the program is to be shared between the contractor and the Navy.
Three basic types of risk-sharing agreements are used in shipbuilding
contracts: Firm Fixed Price (FFP), Fixed Price Incentive (FPI), and Cost Plus
Award Fee (CPAF). (Appendix A)
The type of contract directly affects the bid price for ship construction,
since contractors will bid higher when they must bear more of the program's
risks. On the other hand, the competitive pressures of the bidding process are
likely to induce contractors to lower their bid. Whether the contractor's bid
understates or overstates expected costs, depends at least in part, on the
balance of these two forces
Considering the litigation possibilities, a contractor may be more
likely to willingly underbid a contract. Even under FFP contract, contractors
may point to cost overruns and claim that for one reason or another the
Navy is responsible. Unfortunately, when the Navy and the contractor
cannot agree as to the responsibility for cost overrun, the final outcome is
settled by Requests for Equitable Adjustments. (REA) (Appendix A). The
contractor may recoup some portion of the underbid. If contractors can expect
to receive compensation through the litigation procedures, they may
incorporate this into their bids. This may exacerbate the underbidding
problem. In some cases, this ex post compensation may raise the cost of a ship
12
to the Navy above the cost that would result from an initially higher, more
realistic bid. [REF. 9 pg. 8]
F. COMMERCIAL/MILITARY MARKET
Planning for ship production is done several years in advance of the
actual ship construction to acquire the necessary plant capacity and equipment
required in order to produce at the most efficient rate. This expenditure of
resources is accomplished in anticipation of future contracts and expected
production. When commercial business is readily available efficiency can be
expected in the shipbuilding industry due to continuous production.
However, ships cannot be produced at the most economical rate when
quantities do not utilize the shipbuilder production capacity efficiently.
Increased costs and inefficiencies occur when the quantities being produced
result in idle plant capacity. [REF. 10 pg. 22] Thus, the workload of the
contractor determines the utilization and expectations of plant capacity, this
utilization may then determine how well the overall costs of a program
compares to the estimates.
When there is ample commercial work available the Navy can expect to
incur increased costs and delays for ships due to commercial work being more
profitable. The workload of commercial ship construction affects the cost of
Navy ships by the allocation of overhead costs. When there are more
commercial ships being constructed, the overhead is distributed over a greater
numbers of ships. This lowers the overhead cost per ship. Off setting this
lower overhead rate is the fact that commercial ships are less complex to build
than Navy ships. Due to the technological requirements and sophisticated
systems that must be installed on Navy ships, the construction process takes
13
longer and requires more skilled labor. A commercial ship can be constructed
more quickly and at less cost than a Naval vessel. Therefore, the emphasis
for shipbuilders may be to concentrate on commercial construction and delay
the more costly Navy ships. When there is limited commercial business
available, competition between contractors for Navy ship contracts may result
in lower than expected estimates. These bid estimates may be lower than
actual construction costs as shipbuilders attempt to fill the capacity of
shipyards with Navy construction contracts.
G. SUMMARY
The various reasons for cost growth and factors that affect ship
construction costs have been presented in this chapter. The next chapter will
discuss what has happened to the SCN appropriation and ship cost estimates
over the last 30 years by examining the shipbuilding industry, economic
conditions and other factors that have affected Naval ship construction costs.
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III. HISTORY
To analyze the effects that the factors presented in chapter II have had on
shipbuilding and cost estimates, this research will divide ship construction
data into four periods: Period I (1960-1971), Period II (1971-1975), Period III
(1975-1981), and Period IV (1981-Present). For periods I-III, general results are
discussed using aggregate SCN data. For Period IV, specific analysis was
conducted on four programs: Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG-51), Fleet
Ballistic Submarine (Trident), Attack Submarine (SSN-688), and Guided
Missile Cruiser (CG-47).
A. PERIOD I (1960-1971)
During this period there was heated competition for Navy shipbuilding
work. Although some commercial work was available, it was not enough to
fill the capacity of the existing shipyards. As shown in Figure 3, the
commercial shipbuilding workload declined in the middle of the 1960's.
However, as shown in Figure 4 the Navy was increasing the number of new
construction ships during this time period. Because competition for
shipbuilding contracts was keen for this increased Navy workload, contracts
were awarded for considerably less than the cost estimated and budgeted by
the Department of the Navy. This occured despite the fact that new and
complex ship specifications (e.g. dynamic shock analysis) were being
introduced at the time. The contract form for these awards was Firm Fixed
Price (FFP). Thus, the shipyards were limited in their flexibility and found
themselves in financial difficulty, due to the nature of the contracts and the
15
increased complexity of Navy Ships. They were therefore required to submit
claims to the Navy for compensation adjustments. [REF. 1 1 pg. 9-6]
Figure 3
Commercial ships built or on order 1960-1971
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Research conducted by the Office of Naval Research, titled "Recent Trends
in the Shipbuilding Industry and the Implications for Naval Ship
Procurement," summed up the trends of Period I 1960-1971 as follows:
- A stable work load is necessary for the efficient operation of the
shipbuilding industry. When the work load is slack or unstable,
planning is adversely affected since estimates for future
construction are uncertain.
- Navy contracts have not been conducive to the learning process since
contracts are awarded for small numbers of technically complex
ships.
16
The number of Navy ships constructed has increased, thus the
composition of skills in the shipbuilding industry has changed,
since naval and commercial work require different mixes of skills.
[REF.12pg.35]
Figure 4
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B. PERIOD II (1971-1975)
During the period from 1971 to 1975, contracts for a total of 108 ships were
awarded, including 81 new construction ships. [REF. 13 pg. 31] Figure 5 and 6






Despite the abundant commercial workload and presumably lower
overhead rates (because overhead was allocated over a large workload), there
was significant cost variance between the Navy budget estimates and the final
program cost. As is depicted in Figure 7, the variance was on the order of 20%
for this period, with a swell of 30% in 1975. [REF. 14 pg. 33]
Figure 7











Many factors contributed to the variance between the budget estimates
and the final program cost. Manpower and production resources were being
stretched to meet both commercial and Navy efforts. In addition,
technological developments during this time had a large impact on the
shipbuilding labor force. Progress in nuclear propulsion, automation of
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industrial activities, solid state electronics, supersonic and space flight all had
a revolutionary effect on industry. [REF. 12 pg. 15] This "industrial
revolution" caused the costs of Navy ships to increase. [REF. 12 pg. 17] The
emerging industries were competing for skilled labor. Thus, workers were
leaving the shipbuilding industry for better earnings elsewhere. Hourly
earnings of other industries had increased at a greater rate than the
shipbuilding industry. Thus, shipyards were unable to retain the skilled work
force required to sustain construction. [REF. 12 pg. 18]
This lack of a skilled work force caused the shipbuilding industry to rely
on new and less experienced workers when the industry workload exceeded
capacity. [REF. 12 pg. 19] Since commercial shipbuilding work was normally
more profitable than Navy work, it would be reasonable to expect
shipbuilders to use their most experienced labor in commercial work.
Manpower and productivity for Navy construction suffered. [REF. 13 pg. 31]
New construction starts during this time period included the Nimitz
Class aircraft carrier, Los Angeles and Trident submarines and Perry Class
Frigates. Due to the complexity of these ships, the skills required exceeded
those normally encountered in commercial ship construction, i.e. nuclear
engineering, ship silencing and shock proofing, etc. [REF. 14 pg. 5] The degree
of complexity in naval construction was well stated by John Diesel, President
of Newport News Shipbuilding, when he noted in 1974 that designing and
planning an aircraft carrier involves "more than 2,400 miles of blueprints,
22,000 work packages and 16,000 drawings." [REF 15 p.855] Thus, Navy
construction work was delayed (slipped) and costs increased as shipbuilders
adjusted to the emerging technology. [REF.13 pg. 24] In addition, shipbuilding
20
management failed to adjust procedures and controls to deliver the more
complex ships.
During this time period the inflation rate was greater than expected.
Double digit inflation caused vendor quotes to be unstable and unpredictable.
However, the inflation rate for shipbuilding indices was greater than that of
the consumer price index for both labor and material. This caused cost
overruns by the contractors, and thus the large discrepancies between actual
costs and estimates. [REF. 14 pg. 11-15]
C PERIOD III (1976-1981)
Between 1976 and 1981, budget performance was relatively stable with
minimal variance between the budget and Expected Cost at Completion
(EAC), as shown in Figure 7. During this period, a total of 124 ships
construction awards were made, of which 120 were new construction.
Though the quantity of ships constructed during this time was similar to
the workload of the earlier period of 1971-1975, as shown in Figures 8 and 9,
major adjustments in cost estimating, budgeting, and contracting greatly
improved performance to budget. In 1975, the indices for escalation were
changed to more accurately reflect the actual inflation rate for ship
construction. [REF.16 pg. 6-31]
Budget reserves were encouraged by budgeting for program manager
growth and for future characteristic changes. Budget lines were established for
cost growth and escalation, by establishing target cost and ceiling cost. [REF. 16
pg. 9-6] This allowed for more flexibility and contingency planning. Changes





more predictable. In particular, interest rates had fallen and inflation retreated
back to single digits.
D. PERIOD IV (1981-1991)
Until 1981, the shipbuilding industry was the indirect beneficiary of very
generous government subsidies. Ship buyers received a fifty percent subsidy
from the government to construct commercial ships, providing ample
business for domestic shipyards. [REF. 17 pg. 18]
In 1981, the Government eliminated the Maritime Administration
construction-differential subsidy program. When the subsidies ceased, the
domestic commercial market simply collapsed. New orders dropped severely.
Between 1982 and 1987, domestic ship building capacity declined by about one
third. Forty one shipyards closed, with a loss of 32,000 employees. This all
occured during a period when the worldwide commercial shipbuilding
market remained strong. [REF 17 pg. 20] The Shipbuilders Council of America
reported that since 1987 only three commercial ships have begun
construction. All three were within the last two years. [REF. 17 pg. 21]
As Figure 10 exhibits, 49 commercial ships were under construction or on
order in the United States in 1981. This number has been steadily declining
ever since. Figure 11 shows that the construction of Navy ships has remained
relatively consistent over the last ten years.
From 1981 until present the number of active shipyards in the U.S. has
declined from 25 to 13. [REF. 17 pg. 1] Thus, over this time period, the
principle business income for shipbuilders has been from Navy construction.
23
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Figure 11
Naval vessels built or on order 1981-1991
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Shipbuilders reacted to the decline in commercial ship construction by
aggressively seeking Navy work and contract prices were at an all time low.
[REF. 18 pg. 5]
Economic and industrial factors also fostered increased variance from the
budget. Due to the decline in commercial shipbuilding, overhead rates
increased, as there were fewer units against which to apply overhead charges.
Anticipation of a 600 ship Navy and fierce competition among shipyards were
reflected in overly optimistic pricing during the early 1980's and subsequent
cost growth for the SCN appropriation in later years, as shown in Figure 7.
E. SUMMARY
This section of the thesis discussed how the SCN appropriation has
evolved over the years. Particular attention was placed on how the
commercial shipbuilding industry has reacted to changes in the economic
environment over the last 30 years, and subsequently, the effect on Navy
shipbuilding during this time period. The next chapter will present the cost
categories for ship cost estimates and present the methodology for the study of




In order to forecast future trends, it is necessary to have a data base and
make certain assumptions. Makridakis and Wheelwright state that
quantitative forecasting can be applied when three conditions exist:
-there is information about the past
-this information can be quantified in the form of data
-it can be assumed that the pattern of the past will continue into the
future.
This last condition is known as the assumption of constancy and is an
underlying premise of all quantitative and many technological forecasting
methods. [REF. 19 pg. 351
The analysis in this thesis is based on data derived from various sources
within the Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy. The majority of the
information was obtained from Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) budget
documents. The end cost of a ship is derived from 12 cost categories that make









- Future Characteristic Changes
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- Escalation
- Project Managers Growth
- Total Cost
Each category estimates specific components of ship construction. [REF.
13 pg. 6-1] This information was obtained for four programs during the time
period 1981-1992: Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG-51), Fleet Ballistic
Submarine (Trident), Attack Submarine (SSN-688), and Guided Missile




On the basis of contract drawings and specifications prepared by
NAVSEA, detailed construction plans are developed by the shipbuilder. The
cost of these efforts are charged to this category. This category also includes
related engineering calculations, computer programs, contractor-responsible
technical manuals, damage control books, ship's selected records, and mock-
ups. The lead ship will normally carry the cost burden for this category, since
the majority of these costs are considered to be nonrecurring. Follow ships
may have costs in this category because a lead yard or planning yard has been
assigned to keep the engineering development current for follow on ships.
[REF. 16 pg. 6-28]
2. Basic Construction
The Basic Construction category includes all allowable labor,
overhead, and material incurred in constructing the ship. It also includes an
amount for the cost of money and profit. In addition to shipbuilder-furnished
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material, the price includes the cost for installing all Government Furnished
Material (GFM).
The Navy, requires the shipbuilder to integrate GFM into the ship,
according to the ship specifications, as part of the ship construction process.
This includes receiving, storing, installing and performing checkout and tests
of the GFM items. This process is complex in its own right and is often a
construction related cost driver.[REF 16 pg. 6-3]
3. Change Orders
Over the course of new ship construction, there are numerous
changes from the initial plan. There are various reasons for these changes,
including:
-Incorporating state-of-the-art improvements that come about during the
lengthy construction period.
-Correcting "mistakes" that surface in transition from
two-dimensional drawings to the three-dimensional lead ship final
product
-Incorporating safety items that emerge during construction.
-Including Improvements that are generated by operational
forces afloat.
-Repairing or modifying GFM
These technical changes are accomplished by change orders. There
are two kinds of change orders, Headquarters Modification Requests (HMRs)
and Field Modification Requests (FMRs). HMRs are initiated by NAVSEA.
FMRs are initiated by the on-site Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding Office and
must be less than a set dollar limit. However, the end cost to the change
orders is not identified by either HMRs or FMRs. They are totalled for the
entire change order category. [REF 16 pg. 5-6]
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4. Electronics
The items in this category, both hardware and software, include
electronics production components, training support equipment, test and
engineering services and repair parts associated with installation. [REF 16 pg.
5-7]
5. Propulsion Equipment
The GFM Propulsion H/M/E category may or may not be part of the
end cost. In most cases, the propulsion components for conventionally
powered ships are shipbuilder-responsible, contractor furnished material
(CFM). In this case, the propulsion category is not used. When propulsion
items are provided as GFM rather than CFM, this category is included. GFM
propulsion items can include nuclear reactors, cores, turbines, gears, and
other selected propulsion items. [REF. 16 pg 5-8] The propulsion category is
always used in the case of nuclear-powered ships, since nuclear reactors and
cores are historically provided to shipbuilders as GFM. This is due to the
standardization and safety precautions mandated for nuclear propulsion
systems.
6. Hull/Mechanical/Electrical
Items included in this category, both hardware and software, are
Hull, Mechanical and electrical (H/M/E) equipment, H/M/E deep
submergence systems, small boats, special vehicles, environmental protection
equipment, training support equipment, H/M/E engineering services, repair
parts associated with installation of H/M/E equipment, and all medical
equipment furnished by the Naval Medical Command. [REF. 16 pg. 5-8]
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7. Other Costs
This category is a catch-all summary of a number of work elements.
This category includes Planned Maintenance Subsystems (PMS), equipment
transportation, travel in support of construction, engineering services and
SUPSHIP material. [REF. 16 pg. 7-8]
8. Ordnance
Items included in this category, both hardware and software, are fire
and missile control systems, search radars, missile launching systems, gun
systems, training support equipment, test and integration services, and other
ordnance equipment. Due to the complex and sophisticated systems installed
on Navy ships, ordnance equipment is supplied to the shipbuilder as GFE.
[REF 16 pg. 5-7]
9. Future Characteristic Changes
Future characteristic changes is a reserve account that is established
for future changes in the ship construction process. The amount reserved for
this purpose depends on basic construction cost, number of ships in the
program, the development nature or complexity of the ship and the
likelihood of incorporating new capabilities into the ship during the
construction process. The reserve amount may be used to take advantage of
technical breakthroughs, which make possible the installation of the latest
electronics, communications and weapons equipment on ships still under
construction.
10. Escalation
Contracts for ship construction include an escalation clause to
reimburse the shipbuilder for inflation changes in the shipbuilding industry
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over the life of the contract. The estimated amount required is contained in
the Escalation Reserve category. [REF 16 pg. 2-11]
The cost estimates for escalation are estimates of what inflation is
expected in the shipbuilding industry. The rates are set by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) in conjunction with the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and are adjusted annually. [REF. 16 pg. 6-30]
11. Project Managers Growth
Project managers growth or reserve is a source of contingency funds
for unanticipated future events. The funds are provided in each budget
estimate to cover potential problems and necessary actions that may surface
during the lengthy ship construction process. [REF 16 pg. 8-4]
12. Total Cost
The last category, total cost, is a cumulative amount for all the cost
categories and represents the total estimated end cost of the ship.
C METHODOLOGY
The data for each ship class was compiled from NAVCOMPT P-8 exhibits
(Appendix A) for each year FY 1981 to FY 1991 to obtain a cumulative
comparison of the total funds appropriated and actual costs over the ten year
period. This information was then reviewed to determine what areas of ship
construction are the "cost drivers" in terms of cost differences from the
original estimate. These "cost drivers" were then investigated further, to
determine what has happened in these areas to cause costs to change. The
deviation from the original appropriation was stated as a percentage of the
original appropriation for each year. This allows data to be compared from
year to year and across the four selected ship programs. By comparing
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percentage changes, programs can be compared with each other because costs
have been normalized.
D. SUMMARY
This section of the thesis discussed the data that was utilized for the
analysis of ship construction costs and cost estimates and the methodology of
analyzing the data. The next chapter will present the four specific
shipbuilding programs and analyze what has happened to these programs
over the time period 1981-1991.
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V. DATA PRESENTATION
This section will analyze the DDG-51, Trident, SSN-688, and CG-47
programs in more detail to determine what happened to these programs over
the ten year period 1981-1991. The individual ship class data is presented in
three basic categories. First, the number of ships that have been constructed by
program year is presented. This basic profile data will provide an
understanding of how the program has progressed since initiation of new
construction. Secondly, the total dollar difference between appropriations and
actual cost is calculated for each program for the ten year period. This total is a
cumulative total for the entire ten year period. It shows which areas of
construction have had the most significant cost changes for each program.
Third, the original estimated cost for each year is compared to the actual total
cost to determine any dominant cycles or trends. For ships still under
construction, the estimated cost at completion (EAC) is compared to the
original cost estimate. This analysis may reveal any significant changes in a
program that cannot be determined on a cumulative basis. Each of the
programs presented are at different stages of maturity. The DDG-51 is in the
beginning stages of production, the other programs are near completion.
A. GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER (DDG-51)
The DDG 51 is the replacement for older retiring battle force guided
missile destroyers. Its capabilities include a combat system that can perform
simultaneously in Anti-Air, Strike, Anti-Surface, and Anti-Submarine
warfare missions. The DDG-51 can operate as part of a Carrier Battle Group,
Surface Action Group, Amphibious Task Force, or Underway Replenishment
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Group. The ship displaces less than 8300 tons and is designed with a gas
turbine propulsion system. The design provides for outstanding combat
capability and survivability characteristics. [REF. 20 pg. 479] Bath Iron Works,
Maine was awarded the lead ship contract in 1985 with Ingalls Shipbuilding
Incorporated, Mississippi established as the second source producer in 1987.
All contracts for new ship construction are Fixed Price Incentive. The Navy
currently plans to acquire at least 49 guided missile destroyers, with
production shared equally by the contractors. [REF. 2 pg. 2]
The number of ships that have been constructed or are under
construction by program year is presented in Table 1. These 17 ships have
been funded and represent approximately one third of the total ships expected
to be constructed. The majority of ships constructed have been started within
the last three years. The planned construction rate for the next five years is












The costs for each of the 12 cost categories introduced in chapter IV are
presented in Figure 12. Each of the bars represents one of the cost categories.
The program has had cost overruns since its start in 1985, and the biggest cost
driver for those overruns has been the area of basic construction. However,
the cost for ordnance has been under the estimated cost and therefore
provided offsetting savings to the program.
Figure 12








































The total cost of the program by year is presented in Figure 13. The actual
ship cost is compared to the original estimate for ships that have been
completed. For ships still under construction the estimated end cost at
completion is compared to the original estimate. This data analysis indicates
the DDG-51 program has been consistently underestimated. The difference
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between the original cost estimates and the actual cost have been getting
smaller, but the latest have not yet been completed.
Figure 13
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B. DDG-51 SUMMARY
The DDG-51 is a new program and the cost estimates are subject to many
uncertainties. Any delays or unanticipated problems may drive the cost
higher than expected. [REF. 21 pg. 15] The contract incentives were established
through separate sharing ratios established in the contract. The Navy and
contractor share costs above the target costs up to the specified ceiling prices,
which is the maximum that the Navy will pay. All costs above the ceiling are
paid for by the contractor. The build plan is split between the two contractors,
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with each constructing half of the programs ships. The Navy portion of the
cost overrun amounted to $116.7 million dollars for the lead ship.
Bath Iron Works encountered major delays in designing the lead ship.
This caused the ship delivery schedule to slip by 17 months and contributed
to the cost overruns. The design delays were mainly the result of:
- problems with computer aided design
- changes in design requirements
- late government furnished data [REF. 22 pg. 2]
The cost savings from the ordnance category may be attributed to the
AEGIS weapon system. This is a mature program that has been built since
1978 and previously installed on the CG-47 class cruisers. [REF. 2 pg. 25]
C FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE (TRIDENT)
The Trident submarine is designed to provide a undersea strategic missile
system to ensure that the United States continues to maintain a credible,
survivable, deterrent independent of foreseeable threats. The Nuclear
powered Trident submarine incorporates state-of-the-art technologies in
submarine quietness, mobility and self-defense making the submarine highly
survivable. The Trident submarine can patrol, transit, or evade enemy search
forces at higher speeds than most other SSBNs. It has an integrated command
and control system, including an integrated radio room designed to enhance
the survivability of communication links in a hostile environment. It carries
the latest submarine defense systems. General Dynamics Electric Boat
Division, Connecticut has been the sole source for construction of the
Trident, which began construction in 1974. The Trident program has used a
FPI type contract. The Navy expects to buy a total of 18 submarines. The last
one is scheduled for delivery in 1997. [REF. 23 pg. 11]
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The number of submarines that have been constructed or are under
construction by program year is presented in Table 2. All of the planned
Trident submarines have been funded. The program has had at least one
submarine under construction for the last nine years and experienced only
two years when there were no submarines funded for construction.
TABLE 2
YEAR NUMBER YEAR NUMBER YEAR NUMBER
1974 1 1980 1 1986
1975 2 1981 1 1987
1976 1 1982 1988
1977 1 1983 1 1989
1978 2 1984 1 1990
1979 1985 1 1991
TOTAL 18
The costs for each of the 12 cost categories are presented in Figure 14. The
total Trident program experienced a cumulative cost savings of over $1.0
billion dollars over the last ten years. The largest cost category for these
savings has been basic construction. Although, almost every cost category has
experienced some cost savings.
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Figure 14






































The total cost of the program by year is presented in Figure 15. This
program had one significant change over the last ten years. This change was
in 1982 when the program had a major modification to incorporate the D-5
missile and the Trident II strategic weapon system. Extensive changes to the
submarine had to be made to allow for the new weapon systems and missile.
The Trident II program is designed to provide increased accuracy and
range/payload for submarine launched ballistic missiles. The Trident II
Strategic weapon system consists of six functional subsystems that program
and launch missiles to targets and record system operations during test
firings. The specific subsystems that were changed by the upgrade are
navigation, fire control, launcher, missile, . guidance, and test
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instrumentation. [REF. 24 pg. 18] These changes added approximately $ 617
million dollars to the Trident submarine cost estimate for the first year of the
upgrade.
Figure 15
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D. TRIDENT SUMMARY
During the mid 1980's, the Trident program incurred cost savings that
were used to offset the cost overruns of other Navy ship construction
programs. The significant event that affected the program was the
introduction of the Trident II missile system in 1982. The change to the
Trident II missile system required major changes to the submarine and thus
new estimates for the cost. Since it was a major modification, the cost was
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unknown and the budget was overestimated for the changes. [REF. 23 pg. 8]
This resulted in the extensive cost savings for the program.
E. ATTACK SUBMARINE (SSN-688)
The SSN-688 nuclear attack submarine is designed to destroy enemy
ships, primarily submarines. The SSN-688 submarine is capable of operating
for long periods of time in waters under enemy air and surface control. [REF.
20 pg. 345] Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company was awarded
the lead ship construction contract in 1970. General Dynamics Electric Boat
Division was established as the second source for production that same year.
All contracts for construction are FPI. Contracts for production were awarded
based on the lowest cost bidder. However, each contractor has constructed 50
% of the total number of ships. The Navy has purchased 62 of the SSN-688
submarines since the construction of the first submarine in 1970. The last new
construction submarine is expected to enter service in 1995. With 62 total
submarines, this program has the greatest number of units of the four
programs reviewed. [REF. 25 pg. 11]
The number of submarines that have been constructed or are under
construction by program year is presented in Table 3. All of the planned SSN-
688 class submarines have been funded. While there has been at least one
submarine funded for construction over the last twenty years, the quantity
being built has varied from one to a maximum of six.
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TABLE 3
YEAR NUMBER YEAR NUMBER YEAR NUMBER
1970 3 1977 3 1984 3
1971 4 1978 1 1985 4
1971 5 1979 1 1986 4
1973 6 1980 2 1987 4
1974 5 1981 2 1988 3
1975 3 1982 2 1989 2
1976 2 1983 2 1990 1
Total 62
The costs for each of the 12 cost categories are presented in Figure 16. The
primary change for the SSN-688 program is in the basic construction category.
This category accounts for the large cost overrun of the program. This
program incurred overruns of over $800 million dollars during the ten year
period of analysis.
The total cost of the program by year is presented in Figure 17. As can be
seen from the data, the accuracy of the cost estimates has been very erratic
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F. SSN-688 SUMMARY
All SSN-688 submarine contracts have been overrunning their target cost.
[REF. 26 pg. 2] The program has undergone numerous changes during the last
ten years and the total cost shows these changes. These changes include the
addition of a Vertical Launch System in 1981 for the deployment of cruise
missiles. This required a significant structural change to add the new system.
This change was brought about by the change in mission requirements. The
installation of the cruise missile capabilities added a strike element that the
submarine did not previously require. The addition of the vertical launch
system increased the basic construction for the submarine by $121.5 million
dollars for the first year of system installation. In 1983, the AN/BSY-1
(Advance Combat System) was introduced. This enhanced and upgraded the
sonar system and the data processing capabilities. However, the system had
late and/or faulty design data. Thus, it was delivered late for installation into
the submarine construction. The addition of the advanced combat system and
the subsequent delays caused cost growth for basic construction of $142,109
dollars and electronics cost increases of $76.6 million dollars.
G. GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER (CG-47)
The CG-47 cruiser is specifically designed to carry the AEGIS weapon
system. With this and other advanced systems, the ship is a broadly capable,
heavily armed and survivable cruiser. The CG-47 class is designed to conduct
prompt and sustained worldwide combat operations at sea, as a part of an
aircraft Carrier Battle Group or Surface Action Group; to neutralize and
destroy hostile air, missile, surface and subsurface threats and defeat
simultaneously coordinated attacks by such forces. [REF. 20 pg. 6781 Ingalls
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Shipbuilding was awarded the lead ship construction contract in 1978. Bath
Iron Works was established as the second source for production in 1982.
However, Bath did not begin construction of the first CG-47 until 1985.
Therefore, Ingalls built over three fourths of the ships. The initial contracts
for construction were CPAF with a change to FPI in 1983. The Navy expects to
buy a total of 27 CG-47 class ships. The last one is expected to enter service in
1994. [RER27pg. 11]
The number of ships that have been constructed or are under
construction by program year is presented in Table 4. All of the planned CG-
47 class ships have been funded. The procurement for the program has been
stable over the last ten years, the exception was the last year of the program
when the Navy bought out the remaining contract and budgeted for five
ships to complete the program. [REF. 22 pg. 14] The contract was bought out
for two reasons:
-capitalize on economies of scale from a larger purchase
-complete the program earlier to avoid further delays in other programs
The same contractors build the DDG-51 class destroyer and it may have
been delayed due to CG-47 construction. [REF. 22 pg. 22]
The cost categories for each of the 12 cost areas are presented in Figure 18.
The data analysis reflects the fact that no one cost category dominates. Overall,
the program has experienced cost underruns with savings of over $2.5 billion
dollars over the duration of construction .
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TABLE 4
YEAR NUMBER YEAR NUMBER
1978 1 1984 3
1979 1985 3
1980 1 1986 3
1981 2 1987 3
1982 3 1988 5
1983 3 TOTAL 27
Figure 18



































The total cost of the program by year is presented in Figure 19. The data





The program has had no cost overruns during the last ten years. This
program has been always over budgeted. It has had cost savings that could be
used to offset other program losses. [REF. 21 pg. 16] Several specific events
happened that are significant for this program. The first was the change in
contract type in 1983. The contract was changed from a CPAF to a FPL [REF. 27
pg. 17] At that point, the difference between the estimates and the actual cost
increased substantially. The change in contract type adjusted the burden for
cost risk from the government to the contractor. Second, an additional
contractor was funded for the CG-47 program in 1985. Although the second
contractor was identified earlier than 1985, this was the first year of
production. [REF. 27 pg. 23] The second contractor was introduced to create a
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second source for the CG-47 and to expand the industrial base for U.S. Navy
ship construction. [REF. 28 pg. 5] Also, the introduction of the second source
brought the actual cost closer to the estimate for the program.
I. SUMMARY
This section of the thesis has presented the four specific programs and
some of the changes that have occured to each program over the ten year
period. All of the programs are unique. Factors that make each one different
are:
-mission, each of the missions is unique, thus the ships are constructed to
fulfill a specific mission.
-construction period, each program started construction for the lead ship
at different times, ranging from 1970 to 1985. Therefore each is at a
different phase of production.
-production quantity, total program production ranges from a low of 18 to
a high of 62.
This chapter has addressed the accuracy of the cost estimates compared to
the actual construction costs for each program and highlighted significant
events occuring in each of the programs. The next chapter will analyze the
programs further to determine if there are any similarities among the




This section of the research compares the data for each ship program to
determine if there is any overall pattern affecting all ship programs. It will
also address factors which impact the actual cost of the four selected ship
classes. The analysis will review the relationship between these factors and
the presence of cost overruns or underruns for the final ship acquisition cost.
A. BASIC CONSTRUCTION
Analysis of the data for each of the four programs indicates that basic
construction is the most significant cost category for new ship building costs.
For the submarine programs analyzed, the basic construction costs account for
approximately 47 % of the total cost. For the combatant ships, basic
construction costs are approximately 33 % of the total cost. Basic construction
costs were compared to determine if there are any trends in this category. The
comparison of the four programs is presented in Figure 20.
The analysis reflects that the two programs that experienced overall cost
overruns also had basic construction cost overruns and the two programs that
had overall cost savings also had basic construction cost savings. This would
indicate that the basic construction category is a principal category in
determining the accuracy of ship cost estimating.
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B. ORDNANCE
Analyzing the data for the four programs indicated that ordnance costs
have been over budgeted for all of the programs during the ten year period.
This cost savings is not major for the submarines, however, it is significant
for both the CG-47 and the DDG-51 programs. The cost savings for the CG-47
program has amounted to $712.5 million dollars over the time period
analyzed, and cumulative savings are $335.3 for the DDG-51 program. The
ratio of actual costs to original cost estimates for the ordnance category in the
DDG-51 and CG-47 programs are presented in Figure 21.
Comparing the two programs indicates that the cost savings for the two
programs has been substantial every year from a low of two percent for the
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first ships of the class to a high of twelve percent on subsequent ships. This
could mean a cost savings of $12 to $30 million dollars per ship for the
ordnance category. The data also indicates that the ratio of actual costs to
estimates for ordnance is cyclical for these two programs; furthermore, the
cost savings is increasing. Future cost savings will be higher given the present
trend. The research did not identify any significant program wide events or
factors that contributed to this cyclical behavior. Identifying such factors
would require investigating the prime ordnance contractors or specific
ordnance programs. This is beyond the scope of the thesis.
Figure 21













Each of the programs' total cost can be compared to determine any trends
that may be consistent for the cost of each ship by program year. This may
highlight any major changes in procedures or policy that have affected ship
construction costs. The comparison for all of the programs is presented in
Figure 22.
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As the total cost comparison shows, the CG-47 and Trident had
substantial cost savings during the defense build up of the early 1980's.
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However, their cost savings started to decline in 1985. This may be attributed
to changes in ship construction budgeting procedures.
D. PROGRAM MANAGERS GROWTH
This area of ship construction budgeting was revised in 1985, eliminating
the contingency reserve funds that the program manager was previously able
to utilize for contingency plans during ship construction. With elimination
of this category, programs are more likely to face cost overruns because the
budget has no budgeted flexibility for unknown problems that may occur
during ship construction.
Since this contingency reserve category was eliminated, the overall SCN
budget has experienced net cost overruns, as both Figure 22 and Figure 7
(Chapter III) indicate. This budgeting change may have caused the decrease in
savings. As the data indicates, the actual costs for the three programs still
being procured by the Navy in 1989 were all underestimated. Based on the
current trend in total costs for each of the programs, future funding would be
expected to be below the actual cost of construction. The total cost for each of
the programs is within five percent of the actual cost. This five percent
difference equates to $157 million dollars for the DDG-51 program as a whole,
or $39 million dollars for each ship, based on 1991 cost estimates.
E. COMPARISON SUMMARY
The comparison of the ship programs reveals the fact that the basic
construction cost category has the most significant influence on a ships total
end cost. The comparison also highlighted the fact that the ordnance category
has been overestimated every year for the two surface ships and that there
appears to be a repetitive cycle between the actual ordnance cost and the
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original budget estimates. The data for the total ship costs also indicated that
the reserve cost categories may result in cost savings to a program and that
the elimination of the reserve accounts may have caused programs to
experience cost overruns. The next section will address the factors that were
presented in Chapter II and their effects on the four programs analyzed.
F. COMPETITION/DUAL SOURCE
1. Initial Competition/Dual Source
The SSN-688 and the DDG-51 were competitively bid and dual
sourced from the beginning of production. As Figure 22 indicates, these two
programs have predominantly had cost overruns over the last ten years. The
hypothesis that cost growth in competitively bid contracts is attributed to low
bids by the contractors appears to apply for these two programs. However,
since the DDG-51 is a new program, only a few actual ships have been
completed. Thus, further analysis is only conducted for the SSN-688.
The actual cost for the SSN-688 programs first 18 ships is presented
in Figure 23. The actual cost is adjusted to 1992 dollars and is presented to
investigate what happens to actual ship cost with a second source of
production.
The data in Figure 23 indicates that the actual cost for each ship was
very erratic at the beginning of construction. The peaks and valleys for the
first ten ships correspond to different contractors building the ships. This
indicates that the second source will have initially higher costs. However, the
costs stabilize as the program matures. In this case, the program stabilized by
approximately the eleventh ship.
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Figure 23
SSN-688 Actual Ship Cost ($ in 1992 millions)







2. Introduction of Competition/Dual Source
As was presented in Chapter V, the CG-47 program has had cost
savings over the last ten years. Ingalls was the only contractor building the
ship during initial production. However, a second source contractor was
established during the production phase. This is the only program that
introduced a second contractor during the production phase. Chapter II
suggests that competition may encourage efficiency and lower costs to the
Navy when there is a second source introduced into a previous sole source
program. The data presented in Figure 19 Chapter V, indicates that
introducing the second source in the CG-47 program resulted in actual costs
being closer to the estimated cost. However, the actual cost of the first 18
ships of the CG-47 program indicate that the actual cost increased with the
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second producer (number five), which would be expected, as shown in Figure
24. The actual costs, although declining over the program life, do not
necessarily indicate that the cost to the Navy has actually declined with the
introduction of the second source of production.
Figure 24
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3. Sole Source
When production for a program is sole source it can be expected that
the cost for the program will be high. The contractor can theoretically set the
price for the contract, since there are no other options to procure the ship. The
Trident program was the only program analyzed that had only one producer.
As the data in Figure 15 Chapter V indicates, the actual cost of production for
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the Trident program has been below the estimated cost. This may indicate
that the contractor has overestimated the costs and thus resulted in cost
savings to the program. This overestimated cost may be due to the FPI
contract for the Trident program and no competition during the bid process.
This overestimate would cause cost underruns and therefore allow the
contractor to share in the cost savings of the program. The data in Figure 25
indicates that the actual cost of the Trident has been very stable. The major
difference of this program and the others is that the actual cost of production
stabilizes soon after program initiation, and does not have the peaks and
valleys that the other programs experienced.
G. CONTRACTS
The type of contract to be used in ship procurement is set by the Navy to
meet the circumstances of the particular procurement. When a contractor
undertakes significant risks, the Navy contract will be selected and structured
to share that risk with the shipbuilder. When a program is new and uses
limited quantities of proven technology, such as the early CG-47 ships, the
government will share the uncertain risks of technological advances by using
a cost plus type contract. When circumstances dictate that there is little risk to
the shipbuilder, the contract form selected will place a greater burden on the
shipbuilder by utilizing a fixed price contract. With this contract, the
contractor absorbs any cost overruns.
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Of the four programs that were analyzed, the only one that changed
contract type was the CG-47. In 1983 the contract was changed from CPAF to
FPI. When the contract changed there were substantial cost savings for the
program as shown in Figure 19 Chapter V. This would seem to indicate that a
FPI contract would have lower costs to the government.
H. MARKETPLACE
The term "shipbuilding marketplace" refers to the private shipbuilders in
the United States who are qualified to contract and build ships for the U.S.
Navy. [REF. 28 pg. 13] Ten years ago there were 25 U.S. shipbuilders qualified
to build U.S. Navy ships. Today there are approximately 13 qualified
shipbuilders. Several factors related to the marketplace can influence the
initial contract award price and ultimately the final cost of Navy ships.
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1. Workload
The current shipbuilding workload, including the backlog of new
ship construction and the prospect of future work, are continuing concerns
for shipbuilders and the Navy. [REF 29 pg. 18] A steady stable workload is a
prerequisite to maintaining or improving the efficiency of a shipyard and to
lowering costs. [REF 29 pg. 22] Conversely, an erratic workload with start-ups
and slowdowns may lower efficiency and increase costs. [REF 16 pg. 5-3] A
shipbuilder facing a future drop in workload may be more competitive in
bidding for work that can fill a potentially harmful workload gap. Also, with
few new ship construction orders, shipbuilders may stretch out existing work.
On the other hand, a shipbuilder who is overloaded with work may not show
the same interest.
Most major shipbuilders are dependent on both commercial and
Navy ship construction orders for their business. At times when attractive
commercial work is readily available, shipbuilders may pursue it first. As a
consequence, Navy shipbuilding may ultimately experience higher costs and
possibly late ship deliveries. Conversely, when commercial work is not
available, Navy shipbuilding may experience lower bids from contractors
than expected. [REF. 5 pg. 16]
From the data presented, it appears that commercial demand for
ships has affected the end cost of U.S. Navy ships since 1961. Most
significantly, the commercial shipbuilding industry workload has steadily
declined since the shipbuilding subsidies were removed in 1981. Commercial
builders have competed fiercely for the only business available, U.S. Naval
ship construction. This competitive bidding may have occured with both of
59
the programs that have experienced cost overruns (DDG-51, SSN-688). Of the
four programs that were analyzed, these two had competition for the initial
production contract and thus the contractors may have been underbidding
actual expected costs. Since there was no other commercial business, survival
encouraged them to submit low bids to in order to secure the initial contract.
Presumably they expected to receive increasing profits later. At the time, the
U.S. Navy was expanding to a force objective of 600 ships, as announced by
Secretary of the Navy Lehman. Thus, the shipyards expected significant
profits from follow-on U.S. Navy construction contracts. [REF. 21 pg. 5]
In the current budget environment, the number of new construction
Navy ships is expected to remain very small for at least the next six years as
shown in Figure 26.
Figure 26
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Based on the six year SCN construction schedule, continuous steady
workloads for the shipbuilders seems unlikely given the small number of
new ships to be constructed. Furthermore, of the four programs that were
analyzed only the DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyer will continue production
for the next six years. Thus, plans by the contractors to make any significant
profits on later construction contracts are unlikely based on the current
shipbuilding plan.
I. TRENDS
When the commercial shipbuilding industry prospers or has sufficient
work, the U.S. Navy can expect to receive more realistic cost estimates from
the contractor. This occurs since the incentive for the U.S. Navy contract is
not as critical for shipyard survival. At the present time, there is limited
commercial work in the current shipbuilding industry. Therefore, the
shipyards must rely on the U.S. Navy for their survival in the shipbuilding
business. As Figure 26 indicates, the number of new construction ships to be
built over the next six years is minimal. With the slowdown in ship
construction the shipbuilding industry will continue to face a declining Navy
workload and greater incentive to buy-in to the construction contract.
Therefore, the cost of U.S. Navy ships can be expected to increase above
estimated costs. In addition, actual costs should increase because overhead
costs will be allocated to fewer ships.
J. SUMMARY
This section of the thesis has presented the similarities of each program
over the last ten years. Also, actual construction costs of each program were
presented to investigate how the factors that affect ship costs addressed in
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Chapter II have actually affected the selected programs. The next chapter will
summarize the data presented and the future outlook for ship construction.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Budget estimates that are significantly different from actual costs
negatively affect the Navy's ability to make informed resource allocation
decisions. In the current atmosphere of decreasing defense budgets, the
accuracy of the estimates can have a significant affect on the whole SCN
budget due to the limited number of ships that are currently being
constructed and are expected to be constructed in the future.
This Thesis research has reviewed the last 30 years of the SCN
appropriation account to determine if there are any consistent patterns.
Specific emphasis was placed on four shipbuilding programs constructed over
the last ten years.
A. ANALYSIS
Analysis of the SCN Appropriation and the selected programs indicates
that there are trends or factors that may affect the ship total cost. There are
several areas that were investigated. First, the basic construction cost category
has a significant affect on the actual total end cost. However, the category is
not consistently over or under the original estimated cost. Second, ordnance
costs have been over estimated for all the programs studied. The surface
combatant ship ordnance budget estimates have been significantly greater
than the actual ship costs and appear to have a cyclical trend. Third, the
elimination of reserve funds may have caused each of the programs studied
to' have cost overruns in recent years, particularly for the Trident program
which had previously been experiencing cost savings. Fourth,
competition/dual sourcing may not result in lower costs for the Navy,
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especially in the current shipbuilding environment. When a new producer is
introduced the costs inevitably increase due to initial plant investment and
start up costs. This happened with all of the programs that have dual sources
of production. The expected cost savings may result later in the programs
development. However, the data did not indicate such savings occured in the
programs investigated. Fifth, the type of contract utilized by the Navy for ship
construction has been predominantly FPL Programs utilizing this type of
contract experienced both cost overruns and underruns for the programs
investigated. The one ship program that did change contracts from CPAF to
FPI realized estimated costs closer to the actual cost of construction after the
contract change. Finally, the declining shipbuilding industry, and specifically
the reduction in commercial shipbuilding contracts, may have forced
contractors to under bid for limited Navy contracts in order to stay in
business.
The declining commercial shipbuilding industry has had significant
impact on Navy ship construction costs. As presented in Chapter VI, the
future of the shipbuilding industry in the United States is not very bright
given the declining Navy shipbuilding plan and the limited commercial
construction business available. However, there is a new program initiative
that has been created entitled the "National Defense Sealift Fund." It may
provide some needed new construction contracts for the shipbuilding
industry. This new initiative is designed to provide funds for the
construction or conversion of 20 large, medium speed, roll-on /roll-off ships.
The FY 1993 Department of Defense Budget includes $1.2 billion for the
National Defense Sealift program. Along with the $1,875 billion appropriated
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in FY 1990, FY 1991, and FY 1992, the total funding available will be over three
billion dollars. This fund could help fill the idle capacity of existing shipyards.
It could also maintain the industrial base for eventual surge production of
ships if necessary. While this fund may not bring the shipbuilding industry
back to full construction capacity of previous years, it could mean the
difference between survival and closure for some of the U.S. shipyards and




The Ships Cost Adjustment (SCA) is an annual review of the status of
SCN accounts. It is a detailed review of individual program execution
requirements. The SCA is used to identify program assets and shortfalls such
that they may be adjusted to reflect the most recent execution of program
experience.
The SCA covers all undelivered ships and systems appropriated up to ten
years earlier and in execution for up to eight years in the future. Since
shipbuilding is a high unit cost, low rate, long execution process, the SCA is
designed to adjust to the changes in a program that cannot be done in the
execution process. The results of the SCA review may disclose a need for
reprogramming action to bring estimated ship cost and appropriated funds
into balance.
FIRM FIXED PRICE
Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract entails a fixed dollar amount established at
the time of award and payable to the shipbuilder for meeting the total stated
contract requirements. A FFP contract is suitable for low risk, short-term
construction contracts i.e. repeat buys of boats and craft. Any anticipated
inflation during the short period of the contract is considered in the fixed
price.
There is also a modified form of the FFP-type contract and that is an FFP
contract with escalation. For low-risk, long-term (2 or more years) the Navy
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will include escalation in the contract which provides for inflation due to the
extended length of the contract.
The most significant aspect of the FFP-type contract to the shipbuilder is
that the bid price includes a realistic approximation of estimated costs. A
lesser amount could become a serious problem if unanticipated events during
construction cause the shipbuilders costs to rise.
FIXED-PRICE INCENTIVE
Most major Navy ship programs are contracted for with Fixed-Price
Incentive (FPI)-type contracts. The FPI contract is similar in some respects to
the FFP (with escalation) contract form. A significant difference or added
feature is the expressed Navy intent to share the cost risks and benefits of the
contract along stated sharelines. Inherent within the FPI contract is the
premise that a reasonable target cost can be established and that there is a
reasonable opportunity for the competent shipbuilder to be able to deliver
the completed ship for less than that cost. A fixed target cost, target profit, and
target price are established at the beginning. If shipbuilder final costs (in base
dollars) fall below target, the shipbuilder and the Navy share those savings
along some predetermined percentage shareline. If events force costs upward
past the target, the shipbuilder and the Navy share those additional costs
along the same or similar shareline. In the latter case, the Navy share ends
when total costs reach a predetermined ceiling price. This is the point where
the financial commitment of the Navy is complete and the shipbuilder
remains totally responsible for any additional costs.
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COST PLUS AWARD FEE
A Cost Plus Award Fee contract is used when the status of the program
may warrant its utilization. Such cases could be a lead ship with an
innovative hull, new propulsion system, or the first type of combat system.
The established cost targets in a CPAF contract include anticipated inflation,
and a fee at the time of the award. The Navy pays all allowable costs from that
point on. The shipbuilder can be awarded additional profits, up to
predetermined maximum percentage, if contract performance justifies such
profit.
The cost-type contract provides the shipbuilder with maximum cost risk
protection and the most flexibility on resource use. The cost-type contract can
produce higher cost per unit than a fixed price contract, however this may be
attributed to a factors such as uncertainty associated with new plans,
specifications or requirements.
REQUESTS FOR EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENTS
Requests for Equitable Adjustment (REA) represent claims by contractors
for payment of costs that, according to the claimants, were incurred for work
performed that was not provided for in the contract. The Navy does not
budget explicitly in advance for payment of contested REA adjustments.
REA is a request for payment, extension of the delivery schedule, or both
which is not in dispute at the time the government receives the adjustment.
Whenever such a request cannot be settled by an agreement, the contractor
may file a claim.
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